Abstract
Introduction
Trust Management (TM) is an approach to access control in decentralized distributed systems with access control decisions based on policy statements made by multiple principals. A key aspect of trust management is delegation: a principal may transfer limited authority over one or more resources to other principals. Since delegation gives a certain degree of control to a principal that may be only partially trusted, a natural security concern is whether a resource owner still has some guarantees about who can access their resources. If we think of the union of all policies of all principals as the state of a TM system, then a resource owner always has control over some part of the state, but not necessarily all parts. In this paper, we consider the security analysis problem, which asks what accesses may be allowed or prevented by prospective changes in the state of a TM system. A few definitions are useful for stating the security analysis problem more precisely. In general, a TM language has a syntax for specifying policy statements and queries, together with a semantic relation . We call a set P of policy statements a state of a TM system. Given a state P and a query Q, the relation P Q means that Q is true in P. When Q arises from an access request, P Q means that access Q is allowed in P; a proof demonstrating P Q is then called a proof-of-compliance.
Recognizing that a principal or a coalition of cooperating principals may control only a part of the global state, we assume there is a restriction rule, R, that defines the uncontrolled changes of state that are possible. For exam-ple, the principal in question may consider the part of the state controlled by fully trusted principals to be fixed, while considering that other principals may remove some policy statements and/or add new ones. Given a state P and a restriction rule R, we write P → R P if the change from P to P is allowed by R, and P * → R P if a sequence of zero or more allowed changes leads from P to P . If P * → R P , we say that P is R-reachable from P , or simply P is reachable, when P and R are clear from context.
Definition 1
Let P be a state, R a restriction rule, and Q a query. An existential security analysis query takes the form: Does there exist P such that P * → R P and P Q? When the answer is affirmative, we say Q is possible given P and R. A universal security analysis query takes the form: For every P such that P * → R P , does P Q? If so, we say Q is necessary given P and R.
Here are some motivating examples of security analysis queries.
Simple Safety (Existential) Does there exist a reachable state in which a (presumably untrusted) principal has access to a resource?
Simple Availability (Universal) In every reachable state, does a (presumably trusted) principal have access to a resource?
Bounded Safety (Universal) In every reachable state, is the set of all principals that have access to a resource bounded by a given set of principals?
Containment (Universal) In every reachable state, does every principal that has one property (e.g., has access to a resource) also have another property (e.g., being an employee)? A query of this form can express safety or availability (e.g., by interchanging the two example properties in the previous sentence).
Simple safety queries were first formalized in [9] in the context of the well-known access matrix model [11] . The model in [9] is commonly know as the HRU model. In the general HRU model, safety analysis, i.e., answering simple safety queries, is undecidable [9] . A number of protection models were developed to address this, for example, the take-grant model [17] , the Schematic Protection Model [19] , and the Typed Access Matrix model [20] . The other kinds of queries listed above were not considered in these previous works. Since some of our queries are about availability rather than safety, we use the term security analysis rather than safety analysis.
Security analysis is especially relevant in TM systems, which focus on delegation. While the use of delegation greatly enhances flexibility, it may also reduce the control that a principal has over the resources it owns. Therefore a resource owner who is considering delegating control over access rights needs assistance in assessing the potential consequences. Who could get access? Who could be denied? These simple questions lead to the security analysis queries considered here.
Security analysis is needed when the state of a TM system may change in the future. It is also useful when the global state of a TM system is fixed, but only partially known. Such partial knowledge is typical in distributed systems, and TM is no exception. For instance, previously unknown statements may be presented along with new access requests. Thus, although the global state does not change, one's view of that state is changing. To understand the potential consequences of candidate delegation acts, one needs to consider as-yet-unknown policy statements that could exist.
To the best of our knowledge, security analysis for TM systems has not been investigated previously as such. In this paper, we define a precise model for security analysis in trust management. The policy language we consider is a slightly simplified (yet expressively equivalent) version of the RT 0 language [16] . We call the language SRT , for Simplified RT 0 . All the security analysis queries listed above are considered. While the TM language we are studying supports delegation and is more expressive than the access matrix model in certain ways, and the kinds of queries we are considering are more general, somewhat surprisingly, answering these queries are decidable. Simple safety, simple availability, and bounded safety queries can all be answered in time polynomial in the size of P. Containment queries can be more expensive, depending on which policy language features are used. We show that, for BRT , a sub-language of SRT that has simple delegation, containment queries can be answered in polynomial time. Adding intersection to BRT increases the complexity of answering containment queries to coNP-complete. For the case of SRT , which is obtained by adding an additional linked-role feature, answering containment queries is still decidable (in coNEXP).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the model we use to study security analysis in TM. In Section 3, we handle simple safety, simple availability, and bounded safety queries. In Section 4, we present results about containment queries. We discuss related work in Section 5, and conclude in Section 6. An appendix contains proofs that are not included in the main body.
Instantiating The Security Analysis Problem
The abstract definition of security analysis in Definition 1 has three parameters: the language used to express P, the form of query Q, and the restriction rule R. In this section, we instantiate the security analysis problem with specific parameters, discuss our choices, and give an example that will be used throughout the paper.
Syntax of The TM Language
The policy language we consider is SRT , a slightly simplified version of RT 0 [16] . As in RT 0 , the basic constructs of SRT include principals and role names. In this paper, we use A, B, D, E, F , X, Y , and Z, sometimes with subscripts, to denote principals. A role name is a word over some given standard alphabet. We use r, u, and w, sometimes with subscripts, to denote role names. A role takes the form of a principal followed by a role name, separated by a dot, e.g., A.r and X.u. A role defines a set of principals who are members of this role. Each principal A has the authority to define who are the members of each role of the form A.r. An access control permission is represented as a role as well; for example, that B is a member of the role of A.r may represent that B has the permission to do action r on the object A.
There are four types of policy statements in SRT , each corresponding to a different way of defining role membership: A role expression is a principal, a role, a linked role, or an intersection. We say that each policy statement defines the role A.r. Given a set P of policy statements, we define the following: Principals(P) is the set of principals in P, Names(P) is the set of role names in P, and Roles(P) = {A.r | A ∈ Principals(P), r ∈ Names(P)}.
The language SRT simplifies RT 0 in that type-4 statements in SRT allow the intersection of only two roles; in RT 0 , the intersection may contain k components, each can be a principal, a role, or a linked role. RT 0 statements using such intersections can be equivalently expressed in SRT by introducing new intermediate roles and additional statements. This simplification helps simplify the proofs in this paper. When studying containment queries, we consider the following sub-languages of SRT : BRT (for Basic RT 0 ), which has only type-1 and 2 statements, LRT (for Linking RT 0 ), which has type-1, 2, and 3 statements, and NRT (for iNtersection RT 0 ), which has type-1, 2, and 4 statements.
The four types of statements in SRT cover the most common delegation relationships in existing TM languages such as the RT family of Role-based Trust-management languages [16, 15, 14] , SPKI/SDSI [6, 4] , and KeyNote [2] . SRT captures the basic forms of delegation relationships in the RT framework, though it does not cover manifold roles. The sub-language LRT can be viewed as a simplified yet expressively equivalent version of SDSI. SDSI allows long linked names, which, as observed in [16] , can be broken up by introducing new role names and statements. With the exception of thresholds, the delegation relationships (though, not the s-expression-based representation of permission) in SPKI's 5-tuples, can be captured by using type-1 statements and a restricted form of type-2 statements. A SPKI 5-tuple in which A delegates a permission r to B can be represented as A.r ←− B. A SPKI 5-tuple in which A delegates r to B and allows B to further delegate r can be represented as two SRT statements: A.r ←− B and A.r ←− B.r. Threshold structures in SPKI can be implemented by intersections, as noted in [12] . Similar analogies can be drawn for KeyNote.
Although SRT is limited in that role names are constants, extending role names in SRT to have internal structures does not change the nature of security analysis. As we will see, security analysis is mostly affected by the structure of the delegation relationships. We believe that many results and techniques developed for SRT can be carried over to more expressive languages, e.g., RT 1 [15] , which adds to RT 0 the ability to have parameterized roles, RT C 1 [13] , which further adds constraints to RT 1 , and, to a certain extent, SPKI/SDSI and KeyNote.
The security analysis problem in SRT is quite nontrivial. Semantics and inferencing of SDSI, which is essentially the sub-language LRT , has been extensively studied [1, 4, 8, 10, 12, 16] . Some of these works only consider answering queries in a fixed state. Some considered universal queries where no restriction is placed on how the state may grow [1, 8] . The most interesting case of security analysis, i.e., answering queries with restrictions placed on state changes, has not been studied in these previous works.
Semantics of the TM Language
We give a formal characterization of the meaning of a set P of policy statements by translating each policy statement into a datalog clause. (Datalog is a restricted form of logic programming (LP) with variables, predicates, and constants, but without function symbols.) We call the resulting program the semantic program of P. We use the LPbased approach to define semantics because we will formulate safety computation rules by using a similar approach, and the LP-based approach generalizes easily to the case in which role names contain parameters (see [15] 
A datalog program is a set of datalog clauses. Given a datalog program, LP, its semantics can be defined through several equivalent approaches. The model-theoretic approach views LP as a set of first-order sentences and uses the minimal Herbrand model as the semantics. We write SP (P) |= m(X, u, Z) when m(X, u, Z) is in the minimal Herbrand model of SP (P). This semantics corresponds exactly to the set-theoretic semantics of RT 0 in [16] .
We now summarize a standard fixpoint characterization of the minimal Herbrand model, which we will use in the proofs in this paper. Given a datalog program LP, let LP inst be the ground instantiation of LP using constants in LP; the immediate consequence operator, T LP , is defined as follows. Given a set of ground logical atoms K, T LP (K) consists of all logical atoms, a, such that a :
inst , where n ≥ 0, and either n = 0 or 
Queries
In this paper, we consider the following three forms of query Q: 
Restriction Rules on State Changes
Before discussing how we model restrictions on changes in policy state, we consider one possible motivating scenario. Suppose that the users within an organization control certain principals, and that these principals delegate partial control to principals outside the organization. By using security analysis, the organization can ensure that these delegations do not violate desired security properties, which are specified by a collection of security analysis queries. In this usage of the analysis, roles defined by principals within the organization can be viewed as unchanging, since the analysis will be repeated before any future candidate change is made to those roles. Roles defined by principals outside the organization, however, may change in arbitrary ways, since they are beyond the organization's control.
To model such control over roles, we use restriction rules of the form R = (G R , S R ), which consist of a pair of finite sets of roles. (In the rest of the paper we drop the subscripts from G and S, as R is clear from context.)
• Roles in G are called growth-restricted (or grestricted) ; no policy statements defining these roles can be added. Roles not in G are called growthunrestricted (or g-unrestricted).
• Roles in S are called shrink-restricted (or s-restricted); policy statements defining these roles cannot be removed. Roles not in S are called shrink-unrestricted
One example of R is (∅, ∅), under which every role is g/s-unrestricted, i.e., both g-unrestricted and s-unrestricted. Under this R, all three forms of queries have trivial answers. Another example is R = (∅, Roles(P)), i.e., every role may grow with out restriction, and no statement defining roles in Roles(P) can be removed. This models the case of having incomplete knowledge of a fixed policy state. A third example, corresponding to the scenario discussed above, is R = (G, S), where
, all other roles are unrestricted. If a principal X does not appear in R, then for every role name r, by definition X.r is g/s-unrestricted. This models the fact that the roles of unknown principals may be defined arbitrarily.
We allow some roles controlled by one principal to be g-restricted while other roles controlled by the same principal to be g-unrestricted. This provides more flexibility than simply identifying principals as trusted and untrusted, and permits one in practice to perform security analysis only when changing certain roles. Similarly, we allow a role to be both g-restricted and s-unrestricted, which has the effect of making a safety check necessary when modifying the definition of the role only if adding a new statement.
The above kinds of restrictions are static in the sense that whether or not a state-change step is allowed by R does not depend on the current state. A dynamic restriction could, for instance, have B.r 2 be g-restricted if B is a member of A.r 1 , which depends on the current state. Security analysis with dynamic restrictions is potentially interesting future work.
An Example Example 1
The system administrator of a company, SA, controls access to some resource, which we abstractly denote by SA.access. The company policy is the following: managers always have access to the resource, managers can delegate the access to other principals, but only to employees of the company. HR is trusted for defining employees and managers. 
Answering Form-1 and Form-2 Queries
SRT and its sub-languages are all monotonic in the sense that more statements will derive more role memberships (i.e., logical atoms of the form m(A, r, D)). This follows from the fact that the semantic program is a positive logic program. Form-1 queries are monotonic; given a form-1 query Q, if P Q, then for every P such that P ⊆ P , P Q. Form-2 queries are anti-monotonic; given a form-2 query Q, if P Q, then for every P ⊆ P, P Q. Intuitively, universal form-1 (simple availability) queries and existential form-2 queries can be answered by considering the lower bound of role memberships. A role's lower bound is the set of principals that are members of the role in every reachable state. Because R is static, there exists a minimal state that is reachable from P and R, which is obtained from P by removing all statements defining sunrestricted roles. We denote this state by P| R . Clearly, P| R is reachable; furthermore, P| R ⊆ P for every reachable P . Since SRT is monotonic, one can compute the lower bound by computing the role memberships in P| R .
Similarly, existential form-1 (simple safety) queries and universal form-2 (bounded safety) queries can be answered by computing an "upper bound" of role memberships. The upper bound of a role is the set of principals that could become a member of the role in some reachable state. Intuitively, such bounds can be computed by considering a "maximal reachable state". However, such a "state" is not well-defined since it would contain an infinite set of policy statements, and we only allow a state to contain a finite set of policy statements. We will show that one can simulate the "maximal reachable state" by a finite state and derive correct answers.
The Lower Bound
Definition 3 (The Lower Bound Program) Given P and R, the lower bound program for them, LB(P, R), is constructed as follows:
The worst-case complexity of evaluating the lower bound program is O(|P| 3 ).
Observe that the above lower bound program is essentially the same as the semantic program for the minimal state P| R . They differ in that anywhere LB(P, R) uses the predicate lb, SP (P| R ) uses the predicate m. Therefore, we have the following fact.
Fact 3.1 LB(P, R) |= lb(A, r, D) if and only if SP (P| R ) |= m(A, r, D).

Proposition 3.2 LB(P, R) |= lb(A, r, D) if and only if for every
The "if" part: if for every reachable P ,
Proposition 3.2 means that the lower bound program can be used to answer universal form-1 queries and existential form-2 queries. We have not found an intuitive security meaning of existential form-2 queries, but include answering method for them here for completeness.
Corollary 3.3 Given P and R, a form-1 query
A.r {D 1 , . .
. , D n } is necessary if and only if LB(P, R) |=
lb(A, r, D i ) for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Corollary 3.4 Given P and R, a form-2 query
{D 1 , . . . , D n } A.
r is possible if and only if
{D 1 , . . . , D n } ⊇ {Z | LB (P, R) |= lb(A, r, Z)}.
Proof.
For the "if" part, we must show that if 
The Upper Bound
To compute the upper bound of roles, we introduce the following notion: A role is g-unbounded if for every principal Z, there exists a reachable P such that SP (P ) |= m(A, r, Z). In other words, A.r could have every principal as its member. A g-unrestricted role is clearly g-unbounded.
A g-restricted role may also be g-unbounded, as it may be defined to include a g-unbounded role.
The following fact about g-unbounded roles says that one only needs to consider one principal that does not occur in P (instead of every principal) to determine whether a role is g-unbounded.
Fact 3.5 Given P, R, a role A.r, and a principal E that does not occur in P, A.r is g-unbounded if and only if there exists a reachable state P such that SP (P ) |= m(A, r, E).
See Appendix A.1 for the proof. We now show how to compute the upper bound, which simulates an infinite state.
Definition 4 (The Upper Bound Program) Given
P, R = (G, S), their upper bound program, UB (P, R), is constructed as follows. ( is a special principal symbol not occurring in P, R, or any query Q.)
The computational complexity for evaluating 
Proposition 3.6 Given any P, R = (G, S), A.r ∈ Roles(P), and Z ∈ Principals(P) ∪ { }, UB (P, R) |= ub(A, r, Z) if and only if there exists P such that P * → R P and SP (P ) |= m(A, r, Z).
See Appendix A.1 for the proof. From Fact 3.5 and Proposition 3.6, we have the following.
Corollary 3.7 A role A.r is g-unbounded if and only if UB (P, R) |= ub(A, r, ).
Corollary 3.8 Given P and R = (G, S), a form-1 query
. , D n } is possible if and only if one of the following three conditions hold: (1)
Proof. When A.r ∈ Roles(P), the second and the third condition will not hold; the query is possible if and only if A.r is g-unrestricted, i.e., A.r ∈ G. When A.r ∈ Roles(P), the first condition implies the second condition. Condition (2) or (3) both imply that the query is possible. If none of the three conditions holds, the query is not possible. Condition (2) is needed to deal with the case that some of the D i 's in the query do not occur in P. Consider Example 1 again and observe that the policy is not safe according to either the simple safety query or the bounded safety query. One reason is that the role HR.manager is g-unrestricted, meaning that new managers may be added. Another reason is that the role HR.programmer is g-unrestricted; therefore, new programmers may be added and access may be delegated to them. However, if the company knows that Eve is an enemy, then the company probably will not hire Eve as a manager or a programmer.
In fact, simple safety is quite unnatural: to use it effectively, one has to be able to identify the principals that should never have access, the number of such principals could be arbitrary large. Bounded safety is also unnatural, one does not know, for example, who in the future the company will hire as a manager. A more natural policy is to ensure that, for example, only employees of the company are allowed to access the resource. This can be done by using form-3 queries.
Answering Universal Form-3 Queries
Form-3 queries (i.e., role inclusion queries) are neither monotonic nor anti-monotonic. Given a form-3 query X.u Z.w and three states P ⊆ P ⊆ P , it is possible that P Q, but both P Q and P Q. As a result, the approach taken with form-1 and form-2 queries is not applicable here. We cannot simply look at a specific minimal (or maximal) state and answer the query.
In this paper, we restrict our attention to universal role inclusion queries. We have not found meaningful readings of existential role inclusion queries in terms of security properties. We say that a role X.u contains another role A.r if X.u A.r is necessary, i.e., X.u includes A.r in every reachable state. And we call the problem of answering containment queries containment analysis.
The case that one of X.u and A.r is not in Roles(P) is uninteresting. If A.r ∈ Roles(P), then X.u contains A.r if and only if A.r is g-restricted. If A.r ∈ Roles(P) and X.u ∈ Roles(P), then X.u contains A.r if and only if A.r has an upper bound that is empty. In the rest of this section, we only consider the case that both X.u and A.r are in Roles(P).
Intuitively, there are two cases in which a role X.u contains a role A.r. The first case is that this containment is forced by the statements that are in P. For example, if a statement X.u ←− A.r exists and cannot be removed, then X.u contains A.r. A containment may be forced by a chain of credentials. Forced containment can be computed similarly to role memberships.
In the second case, containment is caused by the nonexistence of statements in P. In the extreme case, if A.r has no definition and is g-restricted, then A.r is contained in every role, since the member set of A.r is empty in every reachable state. To compute this kind of containment, ob- .r, B.r 1 , X. u}. In any P that is R-reachable from P, the member sets of A.r and B.r 1 are always {D}, and so both roles are contained by X.u. A straightforward positive logic program cannot derive this, since X.u contains A.r only if it contains B.r 1 and vice versa. As a result, neither containment relationship will be in the minimal model. To deal with this problem, we take the approach to prove non-containment using the minimal model of a logic program, and derive containment using negation-as-failure. Intuitively, X.u contains A.r unless we can find a witness entity E that is a member of A.r in some state but not a member of X.u in the same state.
Intuitively, containment queries that have the flavor of availability should be proven by forced containment. That a manager always has access to a resource should be due to a credential chain forcing this. In Example 1, SA.access contains HR.manager as long as SA.access and SA.manager are s-restricted. On the other hand, policy statements are unlikely to force everyone who has access to a resource to be an employee; the orientation of the forced containment does not naturally correspond to this practical dependency. In Example 1, HR.employee contains SA.access as long as SA.access and SA.manager are g-restricted and HR.employee is s-restricted. This is because, as long as no new rule defining SA.access or SA.mamnager is added, any member of SA.access is either a member of HR.manager or a member of HR.employee; if furthermore, the statement "HR.employee ←− HR.manager" cannot be removed, then HR.employee contains SA.access.
Answering Containment Queries in BRT
Recall that the language BRT has only type-1 and type-2 statements.
Definition 5 (The Role Containment Program for BRT )
Given a BRT state P and R, the role containment program, BCP (P, R), includes the lower bound program LB (P, R) in Definition 3. In addition, it defines two predicates: fc/4 and nc/4. An atom fc(X, u, Z, w) means that X.u is forced to contain Z.w. An atom nc(X, u, Z, w) means that X.u does not contain Z.w. The program BCP (P, R) is derived from LB (P, R) as follows. We now discuss the semantics of the logic program BCP (P, R), which uses negation-as-failure, but in a stratified manner. Given a logic program LP, a predicate p (directly) depends on another predicate q if p is defined using q in the body. A predicate p negatively depends on q if ∼ q (the negation of q) is used to define p. For example, in BCP (P, R), fc depends on itself, nc depends on itself and negatively depends on fc and lb. A program is stratified if the predicates defined in it can be classified into strata such that each predicate depends only on predicates in the same or lower strata and negatively depends only on predicates in lower strata. A program without negation is trivially stratified, as no predicate depends negatively on any predicate at all. The program BCP (P, R) is also stratified. Predicates in the first stratum are lb and fc, and the only predicate in the second stratum is nc.
Most commonly accepted semantics for logic programming with negation-as-failure agree on stratified programs. 
LP can be calculated in polynomial time, so the semantics of a stratified program can also be computed in polynomial time.
The following lemma says that the fc predicate in BCP is always sound for role containment, and it is complete when the second role is g-unrestricted.
Lemma 4.1 Given a BRT state P, R, two roles X.u and A.r, if BCP (P, R) |= fc(X, u, A, r), then X.u contains
A.r. If X.u contains A.r and A.r is g-unrestricted, then BCP (P, R) |= fc(X, u, A, r).
See Appendix A.2 for the proof. The following proposition says that role containment in BRT can be answered by using the program BCP (P, R).
Proposition 4.2 Given a BRT state P, R, and two roles X.u and A.r in Roles(P), BCP (P, R) |= nc(X, u, A, r) if and only if X.u does not contain A.r.
See Appendix A.2 for the proof.
Complexity Results for Containment Analysis
in NRT , LRT , and SRT NRT adds to BRT type-4 statements. Intersections in type-4 statements have the effect of conjunction. A role can be defined by multiple statements, which have the effect of disjunction. As a result, NRT can simulate formulas in propositional logic, and answering containment queries subsumes determining validity of propositional formulas, which is coNP-complete.
Theorem 4.3 Containment analysis in NRT is coNPcomplete.
See Appendix A.3 for the proof. The coNP-hard part is by reducing the monotone 3SAT problem, which is NPcomplete, to the complement of containment analysis in NRT .
LRT adds to BRT type-3 statements. Linked roles in type-3 statements add the ability to simulate logical conjunction. Recall that the semantic rule for type-3 statements, (m3), has a conjunction in the body, similar to that for type-4 statements, (m4).
Theorem 4.4 Containment analysis in LRT is coNP-hard.
See Appendix A.3 for the proof. We now give an upper bound on the computational complexity of containment analysis in SRT . This shows that containment analysis in SRT (and thus the sub-language LRT ) is decidable.
Theorem 4.5 Containment analysis in SRT is in coNEXP.
See Appendix A.3 for the proof.
Discussions and Related Work
We have shown that containment analysis is intractable in NRT , LRT , and SRT . This means that it is extremely unlikely that we will find an algorithm that is both sound and complete, and also has a worst-case polynomial time complexity. However, heuristic approaches are still possible. For example, it is not difficult to extend our LP-based approach for containment analysis in BRT to the case of LRT and SRT , such that containment relationships in Example 1 can be proved correctly. A possible approach is to use a sound but incomplete method and a complete but unsound method together to approximate the exact answer. Such a heuristic approach may be useful in practice, as it can give an exact answer in most cases. How to evaluate the effectiveness of such methods is interesting future work.
On the other hand, we have shown that in our TM model, simple safety queries can be solved efficiently. As discussed in Section 1, security analysis in the form of simple safety queries has been studied in the HRU model [9] , and shown to be undecidable there. In this section we study the relationships between the two models, arguing informally that the HRU model does not include our TM model as a special case, and showing that there is an intuitive reason why security analysis in our model is decidable. We also seek to clarify the relationship between how trusted users are modelled in the two approaches. After this discussion of related work in safety analysis, we go on to discuss related work in trust management.
Comparison with the HRU Access Matrix Model
In the HRU model [9] , a protection system has a finite set of rights and a finite set of commands. A configuration of a protection system is an access control matrix, with rows corresponding to subjects, and columns corresponding to objects; each cell in the matrix is a set of rights. A command takes the form of "if a list of conditions hold, execute a sequence of primitive operations." Each condition tests whether a right exists in a cell in the matrix. There are six kinds of primitive operations: enter a right into a specific cell in the matrix, delete a right from a cell in the matrix, create a new subject, create a new object, destroy an existing subject, and destroy an existing object. A command may be parameterized, with parameters being subjects or objects. In [9] , Harrison et al. proved that for the HRU model, the safety question is undecidable, by showing that any Turing machine can be simulated by a protection system. For a fixed set of mono-operational commands, safety can be determined in time polynomial of the size of the access control matrix. However, if commands are a parameter to the problem, the safety problem is NP-complete.
In our model, given a state P, the minimal Herbrand model of SP (P) is a set of ground logical atoms. There might be other ways of encoding our TM model in the HRU access matrix model, but the above encoding seems quite natural. From it, we make the following observations.
It seems unlikely that the HRU model subsumes the TM model as a special case. First, in the TM model, creating and removing principals are implicit. A principal can be viewed as created if it is used. A principal is considered removed if no statement mentions it. One could view the matrix as having an infinite number of rows and columns; however, only finitely many cells are nonempty. Second, one step of change in the TM model corresponds to executing many (one for every object when adding a type-2 or 4 statement, or one for every pair of objects when adding a type-3 statement) simple commands in the HRU model. Third, triggers need to be used in order to achieve the effect of propagation.
The last two are the main power of the TM model, and they do not exist in the HRU model. That our TM model cannot subsume the HRU model is immediate from the complexity bounds. The underlying reason is that the HRU commands we use to partially simulate our TM model have fixed schemas, instead of being arbitrary programs. As a result, we can exploit the properties of these fixed schemas. This seems to be the main reason that safety analysis, or the even more powerful containment analysis, is decidable in our model, but not in the HRU model.
Handling Trusted Subjects
Intuitively, a specific protection system is "safe" if access to resources without concurrence of the owner is impossible. However, protection systems often allow the owner to share rights to the resources. In that sense, they are not safe; the HRU model uses a weaker notion of safety: a user should be able to tell whether what he is about to do can lead to the further leakage of that right to untrusted subjects. The following is quoted from [9] .
To avoid a trivial "unsafe" answer because s himself can confer generic right r, we should in most circumstances delete s itself from the matrix. It might also make sense to delete from the matrix any other "reliable" subjects who could grant r, but whom s "trusts" will not do so. It is only by using the hypothetical safety test in this manner, with "reliable" subjects deleted, that the ability to test whether a right can be leaked has a useful meaning in terms of whether it is safe to grant a right to a subject.
Note that deleting a "reliable" subject from the matrix is stronger than stopping it from granting a right. Deleting a subject from the matrix will prevent the analysis from successfully simulating the execution of commands that check rights in the row or column corresponding the subject. However, it is inappropriate to ignore such commands: they may add undesirable rights and they may be initiated by "unreliable" subjects. In such cases, a system that is safe after the "reliable" subjects are removed is not safe in the actual system, even if "reliable" subjects do not initiate any command.
In our TM model, the restriction rule R represents the intuitive notion that certain principals are trusted. In practice, principals are controlled by users. When principals represent resources, the controller is the subject who controls access to the resource. When principals represent public keys, the controller is the user who knows the private key.
Related Work in Trust Management
To our knowledge, no prior work investigates security analysis for trust management systems in the sense of verifying security properties that consider state changes in which (parametric) restrictions are placed on allowed changes. In [3] , a state transition model is used for comparing the expressive power of different access control mechanisms such as access control lists and trust management. There, security analysis is not the purpose. The language SRT is closely related to SDSI, whose semantics and evaluation has been the subject of many previous works [1, 4, 8, 10, 12, 16] . One main difference our work has is that we consider restricted state changes. We now list some similarities. The semantic approach we use is very similar to the semantics in [8] . Both [1] and [8] consider role inclusion queries in additional to membership queries. In some sense, they try to answer queries that hold when arbitrary new statements could be added, i.e., every role is g-unrestricted and s-restricted; the case that some roles are g-restricted is not considered. In [10] , evaluating queries given a set of SDSI statements is reduced to model checking pushdown systems; there, only a fixed set of SDSI statements is considered, which are encoded as transition rules in the automata. Other works [4, 12, 16] do not handle role inclusion queries or consider restricted state changes.
Conclusion
Trust management systems such as RT allow independent principals to delegate partial authority over resources. While this is useful in many situations, delegation also raises the possibility of unanticipated and undesirable access. If Alice delegates access to her friend Bob, how can she be sure that Bob does not give permissions to her enemy Carol? We address this question by studying several forms of safety and availability properties, including general containment queries that capture both safety and availability.
Although the trust management primitives we consider are more expressive than some aspects of the HRU model [9] , our main results show that persistence of nontrivial safety and availability properties may be algorithmically tractable. Specifically, form-1 queries and form-2 queries, both involving containment between a role and a fixed set of principals, can be answered using datalog programs that run in polynomial time. For general role inclusion queries, we look at several cases involving different policy sublanguages. For BRT , which only allows membership and delegation policy statements, containment for all reachable states is computable by a stratified datalog program with negation in polynomial time. For NRT , which is BRT plus intersection, the problem becomes coNP-complete. Intuitively, the reason is that multiple statements about a role represent disjunction, while intersection of roles provides a corresponding form of conjunction. For SRT , which includes role linking, role containment for all reachable policy states remains decidable, but our current upper bound is coNEXP (or double-exponential time).
We believe that security analysis is a critical problem for trust management. While combining policy statements from independent principals has practical appeal, the flexibility of distributed policy comes at a price. An individual or organization that owns a resource no longer has a direct way to determine who may be able to access the resource in the future. The key to providing assurance to trust management users is to develop security analysis methods. The present paper identifies and solves certain security analysis problems, but much remains to be done. In more technical terms, the full impact of linked roles on containment analysis is not yet clear. Our complexity bounds on containment analysis for LRT and SRT are not tight. 1 Although containment analysis has no efficient algorithm in the worst case, there may be tractable subcases or useful heuristics.
We also leave open for future work the consequences of more intricate restriction on policy changes. For example, it may be useful to impose restrictions that depend on the current policy, possibly formulated as policy invariants in some specification language. u, A, r) 
A.r, if BCP (P, R) |= fc(X,
. Basis is trivial. In the step, one of (m1) and (m2) is used to deduce that m( Before proving Proposition 4.2, we first prove two auxiliary lemmas. Readers may wish to read the main proof first and refer to the two lemmas when they needed. The following lemma is used to prove the soundness of (n1).
Lemma A.1 Assume we are given P in BRT , R, two roles X.u and A.r, and a principal
Proof. We use induction on i to prove that for any
The basis is trivial. In the step, one of (m1) and , w 1 , A, r) , so the desired result holds by (c2).
The following lemma says that (n2) is sound. m(X, u, E) . We now construct a P such that SP (P ) |= m(A, r, E) and SP (P ) |= m(X, u, E). P is obtained from P by first removing any Z.w ←− Z 1 w 1 , E) , and then adding A.r ←− B.r 1 . Clearly, P is reachable. By induction on how m(A, r, E) is proven in SP (P ), it is easy to show that SP (P ) |= m(A, r, E).
To prove that SP (P ) |= m(X, u, E), we use induction on i to prove that for any Z.w such that w, A, r) . The basis is trivial. In the step, one of (m1) and (m2) is used to derive m(Z, w, E) ∈ T SP(P ) ↑ i+1 . Case (m1): Z.w ←− E ∈ P . This is impossible, as this means that Z.w ←− E ∈ P , which is contradictory with (X, u, A, r) . The basis is trivial. In the step, one of (m1) and (m2) is used to de- u, B, r 1 ) . Therefore, BCP (P, R) |= nc(X, u, Z, w) by an instance of (n2).
A.3 Proofs of Theorems 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5
We first prove a lemma that will be used in establishing lower bounds on the complexity of containment analysis. The lemma says that if a containment does not hold, then there exists a counter-example state that only adds type-1 statements to P and only uses role names in P. Lemma A. 3 Given P and R, two roles X.u and A.r in Roles(P), if X.u does not contain A.r, then there exists a P such that SP (P ) |= m(A, r, E), SP (P ) |= m(X, u, E), P − P only has type-1 statements, and P only uses role names in P.
Proof. If X.u does not contain A.r, then there exists a P that SP (P ) |= m(A, r, E) and SP (P ) |= m(X, u, E).
Given such a P , we first derive P by replacing every statement A.r ←− e ∈ P − P, where e is a role, a linked role, or an intersection, with a set of statements {A.r ←− Y | SP (P ) |= m(A, r, Y )}. Using induction, it is straightforward to show that the resulting state computes the exact same role memberships. Now P − P consists of only type-1 statements. From P , we derive P by removing all type-1 statements that uses role names (not roles) not appearing in P. For example, a statement A.v ←− D in P , where v does not appear in P, will not be in P . Using induction, it is straightforward to show that, for roles in Roles(P), P computes the exact same memberships as P . Intuitively, A.v ←− D can affect members of roles in Roles(P) unless some type-2, 3, or 4 statement refers to the role name v, which is impossible, since all type 2, 3, or 4 statements in P are in P, and so do not use v.
Theorem 4.3: Containment analysis in NRT is coNPcomplete.
Proof. To show coNP-hardness, we reduce the monotone 3SAT problem to the complement of the universal containment problem in NRT . Monotone 3SAT is 3SAT with each clause containing either only positive literals or only negative literals; it is known to be NP-complete [7] .
Given an instance of monotone 3SAT: 
The formula φ is satisfiable if and only if
ψ = (c 1 ∧ · · · ∧ c ) → (d +1 ∨· · ·∨d n ) is. Define P = P 1 ∪P 2 ∪P 3 ∪P 4 , in which P 1 = {A.c ←− A.c 1 ∩ A.c 1 , A.c 1 ←− A.c 2 ∩ A.c 2 , · · · , A.c −1 ←− A.c −1 ∩ A.c }. P 2 = {A.c j ←− A.p j1 , A.c j ←− A.p j2 , A.c j ←− A.p j3 | 1 ≤ j ≤ , c j = p j1 ∨ p j2 ∨ p j3 } P 3 = {A.d ←− A.d k | + 1 ≤ k ≤ n} P 4 = {A.d k ←− A.p k1 ∩ A.d k , A.d k ←− A.p k2 ∩ A.p k3 | + 1 ≤ k ≤ n, d k = p k1 ∧ p k2 ∧ p k3 } Define R tod +1 ∨ · · · ∨ d n ) is false. Con- sider P = P ∪ {A.p i ←− Z | 1 ≤ i ≤ s ∧ I(p i ) = true}.
P is reachable, and SP (P ) |= m(A, c, Z) and SP (P ) |= m(A, d, Z).
We now show that containment analysis in NRT is in coNP. Given P and R, if X.u does not contain A.r, then there exists a reachable state P and a principal E such that, SP (P ) |= m(A, r, E) and SP (P ) |= m(X, u, E). From Lemma A.3, we can assume, without loss of generality, that P − P consists of only type-1 statements and P uses the same role names. From P , we construct P as follows, let P = P ∩ P ∪ {Z.w ←− E ∈ P | Z.w ∈ Roles(P)}. Clearly, P ⊆ P and P is reachable. By induction on how m(A, r, E) is proven in SP (P ), it is easy to see that SP (P ) |= m (A, r, E) . The size of P is polynomial in P. This means that if a containment does not hold, then there exists a short (polynomial in the size of the input program P) counterproof such that one can check in polynomial time. This shows that the problem is in coNP. The method we use to construct the counter example P also yields an exponential algorithm for determining containment.
Theorem 4.4 Containment analysis in LRT is coNP-hard.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 4.3, we reduce the monotone 3SAT problem to the complement of universal role containment in LRT . Similarly, given an instance φ of monotone 3SAT, we construct ψ = (c 1 Proof. Given P and R, if a query X.u A.r is not necessary, i.e., X.u does not contain A.r, then there exists a reachable state P and a principal E such that SP (P ) |= m(A, r, E) and SP (P ) |= m(X, u, E). From Lemma A.3, we can assume, without lose of generality, that P − P consists of only type-1 statements and P uses the same role names as P.
Given such a P and E, we show that one can construct another state P that has size exponential in P and SP (P ) |= m(A, r, E) and SP (P ) |= m(X, u, E). The way we construct P is through collapsing equivalent principals in P into one, to be made precise as follows. Let SigRoles(P, P , Q) be {X.u} ∪ {A.r 1 | A.r ←− A.r 1 .r 2 ∈ P ∩ P } ∪ {B 1 m(Z, w, Y 2 ) . The relation ≡ is easily seen to be an equivalence relation. For each equivalence class, we pick one principal in it as a unique representative; for a given principal Y , we use [Y ] to denote the representative the equivalence class of Y . We assume that [E] = E. P is constructed from P as follows: for each statement, replace all the principals with their representatives, then remove duplicate statements.
Given P that has size N , clearly SigRoles(P, P , Q) has O(N ) roles. Therefore, there are in total M = O(2 O(N ) ) principals in P , these principals will result in O(M 2 N ) new type-1 statements. Therefore, if a containment does not hold, there exists a counter-example state that has size exponential in P. Once the state is guessed correctly, it can be verified in time polynomial in the size of the state. This shows that the problem is in coNEXP. An obvious algorithm that has double exponential time complexity is as follows: first collect SigRoles(P, P, Q) from X.u and all type-2 and 3 statements from P, and add one principal for each subset of SigRoles(P, P, Q), then enumerate all reachable substates to see whether a containment holds.
It remains to prove that our construction of P works, i.e., that SP (P ) |= m(A, r, E) and SP (P ) |= m(X, u, E).
To prove In the next three cases, a type-2, 3, or 4 statement A.r ←− e exist in P . It must also exist in P, since P − P only has type-1 statements; therefore, principals in A.r ←− e are each in their own equivalence class. The statement must also exist in P , since the equivalence substitution for A.r ←− e will not change the statement. Case (m2): Z.w ←− Z 1 .w 1 ∈ P , P, P and m(Z 1 , w 1 , Y ) ∈ T SP(P ) ↑ i . From
